This paper considers a Burdett-Judd model of the labor market with two types of equally productive workers and two types of firms, discriminators and non-discriminators. Without policy intervention, there is wage dispersion between and within the two worker groups, but all wage differences become negligible when the taste for discrimination is small. We analyze the effect of an equal-pay policy, both in combination with affirmative action and without. When equal opportunity of hiring cannot be enforced, wage dispersion increases and wages for minority workers fall substantially relative to laissez faire. Sometimes also the wage gap between worker groups widens in response to the policy.
Introduction
There are persistent wage gaps between different demographic groups that cannot be related to observable productivity differences. Many researchers and policy makers attribute such gaps to discriminatory behavior on the side of employers. It is therefore not surprising that several countries have implemented legislation to combat discrimination in the labor market. Broadly speaking, such policy measures include equal pay laws, which demand equal remuneration for equal work, and equal employment opportunity laws, covering hiring and promotion practices. But even in the United States, where such legislation has been introduced more than forty years ago, considerable earning gaps between races and genders remain, and the evidence on the impact of equal-treatment policy on inequality is mixed.
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of equal-treatment policy in a search model where a wage differential between two groups of equally productive workers arises due to a discriminatory taste of a fraction of employers. Prejudice on the side of employers (or co-workers, or customers) is one of the two prominent theoretical explanations for labor market discrimination which goes back to Becker (1957) .
2 It is a well known result that taste-based discrimination can only occur temporarily but not permanently if all goods and factor markets are perfectly competitive (see, for example, Cain (1986) ). This finding has led many economists to believe that there is no need for public intervention; to the contrary, market deregulation alone will throw all discriminating employers out of business, whereas policy intervention can only reduce welfare.
Yet, today there is broad agreement between labor economists that the competitive model is not adequate to address labor market issues. Indeed, many important labor market phenomena, such as unemployment and wage dispersion, cannot be explained convincingly in a frictionless environment. Search theory has proven to 1 Exploiting state-level variation in anti-discrimination statutes, Neumark and Stock (2001) show that there is no evidence of a positive effect of equal-treatment legislation on relative earnings of black males, although there seems to be a modest positive effect on the earnings of black females relative to white males. 2 The other is statistical discrimination (Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973) ) which is not considered here.
be a useful and widely adopted alternative; 3 search models have also been applied to discrimination issues, see the discussion below. However, although wage gaps between equally productive workers can persist in frictional labor markets, the policy conclusion is far from obvious. Intuitively, one would expect the usual trade-off between equality and efficiency, so that it is up to the political preferences of society to decide the appropriate strength of anti-discrimination enforcement. In this paper, we argue that this intuition can go wrong: in many circumstances equal-pay policy may both harm equality and efficiency.
We consider a Burdett and Judd (1983) model of the labor market, with two groups of workers (A and B) and two types of firms, some with a discriminatory taste against type B workers. Without policy intervention, the equilibrium exhibits a positive wage gap between the two worker groups and there is also within-group wage dispersion. By assuming that no worker sends only one application, we ensure that inequality is negligible if the disutility taste is small. In fact, our model gives rise to the perfectly competitive (Bertrand) outcome in the absence of discriminatory behavior, but to non-competitive outcomes otherwise. We then discuss two types of equal-treatment legislation. On the one hand, there is an equal-pay law (EPL) which requires that any firm pays the same wage to all workers in the same job. We assume throughout that this policy can be enforced perfectly. On the other hand, there is an equal employment opportunity law (EEOL), or affirmative action, which requires that any firm's workforce must represent the the population shares of the two worker groups sufficiently. 4 Here we contrast two opposite scenarios. In the first, EEOL can be perfectly enforced. Unsurprisingly, in such situations the EPL is able to reduce the wage gap to zero, although some within-group wage dispersion still remains.
The other scenario is the complete absence of EEOL, or, equivalently, the impossibility to enforce such legislation. In fact, enforcement of equal opportunity of hiring is difficult and non-compliant behavior is hard to monitor and punish. Private firms can easily decide not to invite unfavorable job applicants for a job interview without being charged with violation of EEOL. Affirmative action and employment quotas are, if at all, applied to a small segment of the labor market only, such as public employers or government contractors. 5 Further, there is direct evidence of hiring discrimination from field experiments, which also supports the view that enforcement of equal employment opportunity is far from perfect.
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The main result of this paper is that the combination of EPL without perfect enforcement of EEOL increases inequality dramatically; relative to laissez faire, wage dispersion unambiguously increases and mean wages for minority workers generally fall. Because also wages for majority workers are lower, the effect on the mean wage gap between the two worker groups is ambiguous. Nevertheless, we also demonstrate that the wage gap can even increase in reaction to equal pay policy, particularly in labor markets where the number of minority workers is low and the number of discriminating employers is large. The intuition for the adverse policy impact on inequality is easy to explain. Some discriminating employers who are not allowed to discriminate in pay decide to discriminate in hiring. Hence, minority workers receive less job offers, so that their labor supply becomes less elastic than the labor supply of majority workers. In turn, the firms' wage competition becomes less fierce, wage-offer distributions shift to the left, with a support that is much larger than under laissez faire. We also find that not all discriminating firms discriminate in hiring: there are high-wage firms who reject minority applicants but at the same time low-wage firms who hire them despite their taste against them.
There are other contributions discussing discrimination in search models. In the model of Black (1995) , minority workers receive lower wages because it is assumed that these workers do not receive job offers from discriminating employers. In contrast, in our model employment discrimination does not occur under laissez faire; it is the endogenous equilibrium response to the equal-pay policy, and there are also discriminating firms who make wage offers to minority workers, albeit at low 5 In the U.S., all firms with more than 100 employees are required to submit employment reports to the EEOC who is authorized to initiate lawsuits on the basis of underrepresentation of minorities. However, such lawsuits are rare (Holzer and Neumark (2000) ), and firms who want to discriminate against some group (e.g. black males) can easily circumvent the EEOC requirements by hiring more members of another protected group (e.g. white females). For evidence on this last issue, see Bisping and Fain (2000) . 6 For the U.S., see e.g. the audit study of Neumark et al. (1996) and the correspondence test of Bertrand and Mullainnathan (2004) . See also the survey of Riach and Rich (2002) .
wages. Closely related to our model is Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) who consider taste discrimination in a Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model of the labor market, both with and without equal-pay legislation. They also show that this policy does not eliminate wage gaps, but again they assume that minority workers are discriminated in hiring, uniformly across all disutility firms. Our model, in contrast, derives hiring strategies endogenously and they are not uniform across firms. In contrast to these wage-posting models, Rosen (2003) considers a model with wage bargaining and finds that discriminating firms can achieve higher profits than nondiscriminating firms, thus arguing that discriminating employers are more likely to survive in the long run. In our model, as in the others discussed above, this is not the case: discriminating employers earn lower profits than nondiscriminating employers. Nevertheless, we show that discriminators' profits can increase when equal-pay policy is introduced. Finally, Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005) consider a model where search is directed rather than random. Assuming that firms cannot discriminate in pay, a non-negligible wage gap arises even when the disutility taste is arbitrarily small. In their model, all firms have discriminatory preferences, ranking majority applicants before minority applicants. Minority workers do not apply to firms posting high wages where hiring chances are very low since only these jobs attract majority applicants. In equilibrium, thus, complete market segregation arises. However, firms rarely post wages publicly in the real world, and although segregation is a prevalent phenomenon, it is far from perfect.
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Of course our paper is not the first pointing at adverse impacts of equal-treatment policies. Welch (1976) argues that equal-treatment policy entails allocative efficiency losses, but this is little surprising given that there are no frictions in his model. On the other hand, Lundberg and Startz (1983) show that in a model of statistical discrimination, an equal-pay policy can raise welfare by inducing minority workers to invest more in their human capital. By contrast, Coate and Loury (1993) argue that affirmative-action policies do not necessarily promote equality because of a patronization problem: protected workers anticipate that their employment chances are good even if they do not invest in productive skills. Our mechanism is 7 Shi (2006) also discusses between-group wage inequality in a directed search framework. He argues that actual wage differentials among similar workers may not be a valid indicator of discrimination. What really matters are expected wages which include job-finding chances.
much more basic and describes simply the labor market response to equal-treatment policy, abstracting from any long-run effects on human capital investment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section 3 derives equilibrium without policy regulation, and Section 4 discusses the scenario where equal pay policy is combined with strict affirmative action. Section 5 considers the effect of an equal-pay policy when equal opportunity of hiring cannot be enforced. Section 6 analyzes the policy impact on mean wages and on the wage gap numerically. Section 7 concludes.
The Model
We consider a Burdett and Judd (1983) model of the labor market, with heterogenous workers and with a discriminatory taste disturbing the preferences of some employers. There is a continuum [0, 1] of workers divided into two types, (1 − σ) fraction are type A and σ fraction are type B workers. Both worker types are nonnegligible, i.e. σ ∈ (0, 1). When employed, all workers have the same productivity p > 0 and the reservation wage is common to all workers and normalized to zero.
There is a large number N of firms, each of which can hire an arbitrary number of workers to produce output p per worker. Fraction λ of firms are "disutility firms" who derive linear disutility d for every B worker in their workforce. The disutility taste is low enough so that these firms are willing to hire B workers at a sufficiently low wage; that is, d < p. The remaining (1 − λ)N firms are conventional profit maximizers; they are indifferent between hiring A or B workers. We assume that N is such a large number that each firm, regardless of its type, perceives (approximately) that a fraction λ of its competitors are again disutility firms. Importantly, although each firm is small relative to its competitors, it is large relative to workers; particularly, each firm ends up employing an infinity of workers. The actual number N turns out to be irrelevant for equilibrium since there are no capacity constraints at any firm. 8 All parameters p, σ, λ, and d are exogenously given.
8 Alternatively, we could assume that there are [0, M ] workers and consider the limit where M, N → ∞ and N/M = θ is constant. Here the level of θ would be irrelevant for equilibrium; it merely determines employment per firm with no effect on wages.
In the absence of policy regulation (laissez faire), the sequence of events is as follows.
Stage I Every worker applies at exactly two random firms.
Stage II Every firm j offers jobs at wage w j A to A applicants and at wage w j B to B applicants.
Stage III Workers accept the best offer as long as the offer is at least as high as their reservation wage b = 0. If a worker has two equal offers, he accepts any of them with the same chance.
A few remarks are in order. First, although firms offer wages after workers apply, this framework is equivalent to one where firms commit to wages before the application stage and where search is random, as is the case in Burdett and Judd (1983) . Second, the firms' wage policies are restricted to rule out within-group wage discrimination. This is not a critical requirement. Even if firms were allowed to wage discriminate between workers of the same type, they do not exercise this option.
9 Third, the assumption that each worker only sends two applications (rather than applying at all firms) captures the search frictions in this model which eventually gives rise to non-competitive wages. Note that when all workers and jobs are identical (which would be the case when d = 0 or σ = 0 or λ = 0), two applications are enough to yield the perfectly competitive outcome through Bertrand wage competition.
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Otherwise, however, firms can exercise market power, wages for B workers differ from their marginal product, and there is wage dispersion. Below we consider alternative scenarios where policy alters the set of feasible strategies at stage II.
At the second stage, firms maximize their payoff by setting wages for A workers and B workers respectively, taking the wage offer distributions of other firms as given.
9 Although it may happen that firms are indifferent between several wage offers, the assumption that there is no within-firm wage dispersion (among workers of the same type) restricts the equilibrium set only trivially. All wage dispersion, if any, happens across firms in this model. This is also in line with the empirical finding that most wage dispersion is between firms rather than within firms. 10 This is Lemma 2(ii) of Burdett and Judd (1983) . If workers would send only one application with positive probability less than one, there would be wage dispersion even with homogenous workers. On the other hand, if all workers would send m ≥ 2 applications with m < N , results would be qualitatively similar.
The payoff of a nondisutility firm offering wages (w A , w B ) is simply its profit
where l s (w s ) is the employment of type s = A, B workers that are hired by a particular firm offering wage w s . The payoff of a disutility firm offering (w A , w B ) is profit minus linear disutility of B employment:
Since search is random, the number of applications of A (B) workers at any firm is the same. Consequently, expected employment of A (B) workers only depends on the wage offer but is independent of the firm type. Let F s d (w s ) and F s n (w s ) denote the cumulative wage offer distributions to s workers, s = A, B, by disutility and nondisutility firms, respectively. Then employment levels are
For example, in the first equation,
is the mass of A workers applying at a particular firm, and the expression in square brackets is the share of those workers whose second offer is no larger than w A .
Clearly, the wage offer distribution function that B workers face differs from the one for A workers, since some firms derive a disutility taste when employing B workers. While disutility firms bid up their wage offers up to their "effective" marginal product p − d, the full wage offer distribution does not degenerate at that value. Nondisutility firms know that some of their B applicants obtain another offer from a disutility firm at w = p − d while other B applicants may obtain the second offer from a nondisutility firm that can profitably hire this worker at larger wages. Hence nondisutility firms face the usual trade-off between low wage costs and higher recruitment rates which gives rise to wage dispersion, as in the static model of Burdett and Judd (1983) , or in dynamic models with search-on-the-jobà la Burdett and Mortensen (1998) .
Since the wage offer distribution F B d degenerates at p − d, the lower bound of distribution F B n must be equal to p − d: no nondisutility firm will attract any worker by offering w < p − d; and if the lower bound of the support of F B n was at w > p − d, the firm offering w would hire the same number of workers at lower cost at wage offer w − ε > p − d. On the other hand, no nondisutility firm will exactly offer p − d since it can attract share λ/2 of all B applicants at this wage (share λ/2 of them will go to a disutility firm offering the same wage and share 1 − λ go to a nondisutility firm offering a higher wage), whilst it hires at least share λ of all B applicants at any slightly larger wage. In other words, the payoff function of nondisutility firms jumps upwards at w = p − d. Using standard arguments, one can also show that the distribution of wage offers of nondisutility firms cannot have mass points and must be strictly increasing. Hence the support of
To find the equilibrium distribution, we make use of the indifference condition which states that any wage w ∈ (p − d, w B ] yields the same expected payoff as a wage offer arbitrarily close to, but above p − d:
Solving yields the unique equilibrium wage offer distribution of nondisutility firms for B workers:
which has upper bound w B = p − dλ. Hence, the market wage offer distribution for B workers is
Proposition 1: Under laissez-faire, the unique equilibrium wage offer distribution for A workers degenerates at w = p. The wage offer distribution for B workers is non-degenerate with support [p − d, p − λd] and cumulative distribution (1). All B workers earn lower wages than A workers. A disutility firm obtains zero payoff and positive profit λσd/N , and a nondisutility firm earns profit 2σλd/N . Every nondisutility firm employs more B workers than any disutility firm.
In contrast to a perfectly competitive labor market, a discriminatory taste of some firms together with search frictions affects the shape of the wage offer distributions which exhibits both between-group and within-group (group B only) wage dispersion.
Equal pay with strict affirmative action
Now suppose the government imposes an equal-pay law that prohibits wage differentials in identical occupations within the same firm. Suppose furthermore that there is a perfectly enforceable equal-employment-opportunity law in place which requires that each firm must employ at least as many B workers in relation to its A workers as is the corresponding relation in the working population. Alternatively, the program could require that the B-A ratio of its new hires is not lower than this ratio in the firm's application pool. But this second requirement is identical to the first in the random search environment considered here. In any case, the legislation ensures that the ratio between B and A employment in any firm may not fall short of σ/(1 − σ). Under this policy regime, each firm can offer only one wage to both types of workers and it cannot reject any B applicant whenever it hires all A applicants. Formally, the second stage of our model is altered as follows.
Stage II Every firm decides a common wage w for all its workers. It may offer this wage to as many applicants as it wishes to, but the ratio between B workers and A workers may not fall short of σ/(1 − σ).
Clearly, a nondisutility firm hires all applicants at any wage w < p. If a disutility firm hires ℓ workers at wage w, its payoff is (p − σd − w)ℓ since fraction σ of its workers must be of type B. Hence, a disutility firm decides to hire all applicants at any wage w < p − σd, but it is unwilling to hire any worker at a wage w > p − σd. Put differently, p − σd is the average marginal payoff of an additional worker for a disutility firm in this policy regime. As usual, we assume that disutility firms also hire all applicants at wage w = p − σd, although they are indifferent between all legal hiring strategies at this wage.
Similar to the laissez-faire case for B workers, there is again perfect wage competition between disutility firms who bid their wage offers up to their effective marginal product p − σd. Any lower wage offer is certainly rejected since each worker receives another offer which is strictly larger. On the other hand, the wage offer distribution of nondisutility firms is not degenerate. The positive probability that an applicant gets his second offer from a disutility firm at p − σd gives these firms some market power, so that they randomize wages from a common distribution whose lower bound is at p − σd.
In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, nondisutility firms are indifferent between all wages in the support of the wage offer distribution:
Solving yields the equilibrium wage offer distribution of nondisutility firms:
whose upper bound is p−dσλ. The market wage offer distribution, i.e. the fraction of all firms paying w or less to both types of workers, is
(2)
Comparison with (1) shows that the wage-offer distribution first-order stochastically dominates the distribution for B workers under laissez-faire. Therefore, the mean wage for B workers is higher while the mean wage for A workers is lower under the policy. Obviously, the wage differential between the different demographic groups is totally eliminated. Perhaps surprisingly, profits for all firms are unchanged relative to laissez-faire.
Proposition 2: Under the equal-pay policy with strict affirmative action, the equilibrium wage offer distribution has support [p − σd, p − λσd] and cumulative distribution (2) which stochastically dominates the distribution for B workers under laissez-faire. Mean wages for A and B workers are equalized. Disutility firms obtain zero payoff and positive profit λσd/N , and nondisutility firms earn profit 2σλd/N , the same as under laissez-faire.
Equal pay without affirmative action
When combined with strict affirmative action, equal-pay legislation succeeds in removing labor market discrimination completely. However, such an ideal result obtains only if the employers are not allowed to discriminate in hiring by rejecting less attractive job applicants. That is, equal opportunity of hiring must be perfectly enforced. As we have argued in the introduction, there are several reasons why this may not be the case. On the other hand, we believe that an equal-pay legislation is much easier to enforce than equal opportunity of hiring. A minority worker who is paid less for the same job in the same firm than his majority fellow can easily prove the case of unequal treatment. No firm will thus be able to pay different wages to A and B workers in the same occupation. Therefore, it is necessary to reconsider the situation where an equal-pay policy is implemented in the presence of hiring discrimination. The key question is whether the policy is still effective in lowering wage inequality and raising wages for B workers. We now have:
Stage II Every firm decides a common wage w for all its workers. It may offer this wage to as many applicants as it wishes to.
In this alternative policy scenario, a disutility firm decides to hire all applicants at any wage offer w < p − d but it rejects all B applicants at any wage offer w > p − d. Consequently, the equilibrium outcome of Proposition 2 cannot be sustained anymore. Particularly, at their equilibrium wage offer p − σd, all disutility firms would reject as many B applicants as possible since their marginal payoff is negative p − d − w < 0. This also implies that there must be hiring discrimination in equilibrium, i.e. some disutility firms must offer wages w > p − d and reject B workers. For if this was not the case, hiring behavior would be the same as in the previous section; fierce wage competition would set in again so that, at some point, all firms will offer wages above p − d which then, in turn, must lead disutility firms to reject B applicants.
Since some B applications get rejected, all firms obtain additional market power and are inclined to change their pay policy; anticipating that some workers do not obtain a second offer, they are able to attract a few workers by merely offering the reservation wage. Indeed, the lower bound of the wage offer distribution must now be at zero.
Because the possibility of hiring discrimination affects B workers only, labor supply of B workers to any firm is generally less elastic than labor supply of A workers. For this reason, a nondisutility firm offers a lower wage than a disutility firm who offers w > p − d and attempts to hire only A workers whose labor supply is more elastic. Indeed, it turns out that many low-wage jobs are offered by nondisutility firms who hire all types of workers, whilst high-wage jobs are only offered by disutility firms who only hire A workers. Sometimes, however, also a fraction of disutility firms decide to offer low wages to hire all types of workers. The wages offered by these disutility firms are even lower than the wages at nondisutility firms. This is intuitively easy to explain: the marginal payoff of an additional worker is larger at a nondisutility firm than at a disutility firm that hires all workers. These findings can be formally stated in the following Lemma which is proven in the Appendix.
Lemma: Let F = λF d + (1 − λ)F n be the distribution of wage offers. Then F is strictly increasing and continuous (that is, there are no holes and no mass points) and the lower bound of the support is at the workers' reservation wage of zero. Moreover, for any w n in the support of F n and w
From this Lemma follows that equilibrium can be described as follows. There are wage thresholds 0 ≤ w 0 ≤ p − d < w 1 < w < p and a number µ ∈ [0, 1) such that:
1. Fraction µ of disutility firms make low wage offers, drawn from distribution 2. Nondisutility firms draw wage offers from distribution F n which has support [w 0 , w 1 ], and they hire all applicants.
3. Fraction 1−µ of disutility firms make high wage offers, drawn from distribution We proceed by deriving the equilibrium wage distribution sequentially for given µ, from bottom to top. At the end, fraction µ is determined to ensure that disutility firms are indifferent between offering wages in the lower or in the upper wage range. For some parameter configurations, particularly when the disutility parameter is large enough, no disutility firms offer low wages, in which case µ = 0 and w 0 = 0. On the other hand, it always holds that µ < 1; there must be some disutility firms rejecting B applicants, as has been explained above.
Consider first the wage-offer distribution for low-wage disutility firms. These firms are indifferent between offering any wage w ∈ [0, w 0 ], or the zero reservation wage, at which they hire only those B applicants who send the second application to a high-wage disutility firm where they are rejected:
This yields the wage offer distribution
and the upper bound of its support at
Wages in the medium range w ∈ [w 0 , w 1 ] are offered by nondisutility firms. Here the indifference condition is that
which yields
The upper bound follows from F n (w 1 ) = 1 together with (3) as
In the highest wage range [w 1 , w], the remaining 1 − µ fraction of disutility firms are active. Because of w 1 > p − d (as we prove below), they reject all B applications, so their indifference condition amounts to 
Finally, the unknown variable µ follows from the requirement that payoff of all disutility firms must be the same. Provided that µ ∈ (0, 1), this is satisfied whenever the disutility firm offering w = 0 gets the same payoff as the one that offers w 1 and rejects B applicants:
Using (4) and solving yields
Clearly, µ < 1 is always satisfied when there are some A workers (σ < 1). 14 However, the presence of disutility firms offering low wages (µ > 0) and hiring B workers requires that the disutility taste parameter is not too large:
When d ≥ d * , all disutility firms offer high wages and reject B applicants who are then either hired by a nondisutility firm or do not get a job if they happen to send both applications to disutility employers.
It can also be confirmed that the derived wage thresholds (3) and (4) 
which is smaller than p − d iff λ < 1. In the limit λ → 1 (no nondisutility firms), both thresholds obviously collapse at w = p − d.
The combined market wage offer distribution F (w) = λµF Figure 1 , is
Relative to the outcomes under laissez faire and under strict enforcement of pay and hiring equality, wage dispersion is much larger under this policy regime. In the absence of hiring discrimination, no firm is willing to offer wages below w = p − d (under laissez faire) or below w = p − σd (under equal pay with affirmative action). With a reasonably small disutility taste parameter, wage dispersion is small since all wages are close to marginal product. Without enforcement of hiring equality, however, there are always firms who offer much lower wages and the support of the wage offer distribution is larger, certainly so when d ≤ p/2. 15 Although overall wage dispersion increases, it is analytically intractable to answer what happens to the mean wages of workers in the two groups and to the wage gap between A and B workers, although it is obvious that a positive wage gap must remain. The next section sheds light on these questions with a few numerical examples. On the other hand, it is possible to show that payoffs of all firms are always higher than under laissez faire (see the proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 3: Under the equal-pay policy without affirmative action, the wage-15 Nevertheless, in the limit d → 0 the wage offer distribution (7) converges to the Dirac distribution at w = p. Although the support of F remains large, the variance becomes arbitrarily small in this limit.
offer distribution is (7) with thresholds w 0 , w 1 and w as defined in (3), (4), and (5), and µ as in (6) when d < d * , and µ = 0 otherwise. Provided that d ≤ p/2, the support of the wage offer distribution is larger than under laissez-faire or under equal pay with equal opportunity of hiring. Payoffs of all firms are higher than under laissez-faire, although profits of disutility can be higher or lower.
Mean wages and the wage gap
In this section we analyze numerically whether the equal pay policy is effective in lowering wage inequality and raising wages for B workers when the policy is not supported by perfect affirmative action. We are also interested in the role of the proportion of minority workers and that of disutility firms for the effectiveness of the equal pay policy. If the policy would magnify wage inequality between different demographic groups of workers or lower wages for B workers under certain conditions, the policy maker should be more cautious to implement it.
In all numerical examples, we normalize workers' productivity to p = 1. Moreover, we choose reasonably small values for the disutility taste parameter, d ∈ {.1, .2}. Then, to analyze whether inequality between the two worker groups is amplified, we vary parameter values of λ and σ to check the impact of the equal-pay policy on the wage gap 16 and on the mean wage of B workers. If a B worker happens to send both applications to high-wage disutility firms rejecting him, we assume that this worker can still find employment in a competitive, outside labor market at his zero reservation wage. The alternative would be to treat these workers as unemployed, which would give rise to a higher mean wage for B workers which, however, would not adequately reflect their impaired employment perspectives. For the calculations of mean wages see the Appendix. to the proportion of minority workers and that of disutility firms in the market. In Figure 2 (a), the disutility parameter is set at d = 0.2. In this case, if less than 30% of all workers are type B and most of the firms have a disutility taste against these workers, the policy increases the wage gap instead of reducing it. Nevertheless, for a large set of parameter constellations, the policy reduces the wage gap between A and B workers. When the disutility taste is smaller, as in Figure 2 (b), these results do not change much.
However, what ultimately matters for discriminated workers is not the wage gap per se, but whether their own wages increase. Therefore, it is interesting to find out how the policy affects the mean wage of B workers. Figure 3 shows the difference between the mean wage of B workers under laissez faire and under the equal-pay policy, again for different parameter configurations of σ and λ.
These examples give us a clear overview. In both cases the mean wage of B workers is almost always reduced by the policy. Only when the market is composed of a very small proportion of B workers and a large proportion of nondisutility firms, the mean wage of B workers rises slightly. Furthermore, under the parameter configurations of λ and σ, where the wage gap is increased, the mean wage of B workers is always tremendously reduced by the equal pay policy. After the introduction of equal pay legislation, some disutility firms discriminate in hiring. If a B worker happens to send both of his applications to those firms, he will always be rejected and receive only the reservation wage of zero. But also in other situations, wages are much lower. Sometimes B workers only receive one offer which they always accept, and even if they receive two offers, they will not be drawn from the highest range [w 1 , w] where only A workers find employment. Further, if B workers represent a smaller share of the labor force, competition for A workers is fiercer so that more disutility firms raise their wages to eventually reject B applicants (formally, µ is increasing in σ). Therefore wages for B workers are particularly low when there are only few of these workers.
Hence, our model predicts that if the labor market has a small proportion of minority workers and a large proportion of disutility firms, equal pay policy alone cannot be a good strategy from both the aspects of efficiency and equality. On the one hand, efficiency is impaired by the regulation. Without the policy regulation, all workers are employed by some firm with productivity p, but after the introduction of equal pay legislation, some B workers do not find employment but rather receive their reservation wage income (either in unemployment or in an outside labor market).
On the other hand, wage inequality is increased by the policy. Not only can the wage gap increase, but mean wages of discriminated workers fall almost always. Furthermore, within-group wage dispersion also increases substantially. Hence, both equality and efficiency will be harmed by equal-pay policy in our model.
Conclusion
The literature on labor search and discrimination has been successful in explaining the persistence of between-group wage differentials, but remains rather silent about policy implications. This paper sheds light on the impact of equal pay legislation in combination with and without affirmative action policy on the wage differential in the labor market. In a random search model with taste-based discrimination, it is shown that equal-pay policy is not necessarily a good strategy for promoting wage equality between different demographic groups of workers. The key results of this paper can be summarized as follows.
• Under laissez faire, the existence of a discriminatory taste generates both between-group and within-group wage dispersion. Nevertheless, wage inequality remains small for plausibly weak employer disutility parameters.
• If equal-pay legislation is supported by a strict affirmative action program, the policy succeeds in perfectly eliminating the wage differential between the two groups of workers. Within-group wage dispersion remains small. There is no negative impact on firms' profits or on welfare.
• In contrast, if affirmative action is not applicable, the policy causes discriminatory practices in hiring of some or all discriminators, which raises all employers' market power. Overall wage dispersion is enormously amplified, even when the disutility taste is small. A positive wage gap remains which can be even larger than under laissez faire. Mean wages for minority workers are almost always lower. Both discriminators and non-discriminators gain from the policy.
It is an open issue how far these policy implications extend to more general situations where the strength of affirmative action varies continuously between the two extremes discussed in this paper, as suggested in footnote 13. Whenever affirmative action is not perfect (γ < 1), some hiring discrimination must occur in equilibrium and some firms will attempt to hire rejected B workers at the reservation wage; hence the support of the wage-offer distribution must increase significantly under the policy. However, we expect that all moments of the wage distributions vary smoothly in the policy parameter γ.
B workers whose second application goes to a high-wage disutility firm (note that, because of Claim 1, the chance that the second offer comes from a firm that also offers w is zero). But these workers can also be hired at w = 0 at strictly higher payoff.
Claim 4: Let w x be in the support of F x , x = d, n, and let
The proof is the same as in related wage dispersion models with productivity heterogeneity. From payoff maximization follows that
where ℓ(w) is employment (of A and B workers), a weakly increasing function of the wage offer w. This implies that
from which follows that
Since d > 0 and ℓ is weakly increasing, w n ≥ w d .
Claim 5: Let w x be in the support of F x , x = d, n, and let w d > p − d. Then w d ≥ w n holds. Suppose instead that w d < w n . Then there are three possibilities, all of which will lead to a contradiction (note that the support is connected, from Claim 2).
First, there is an interval I = (w d ,w) which belongs to the support of F d and not to the support of F n , butw ≤ w n belongs to the support of F n . Second, an open interval I = (w d ,w) belongs to the support of both F n and F d . Third, there is an interval I = (w d ,w) belonging to the support of F n but not to the support of F d , for somew ≤ w n .
Suppose the first possibility was true. Then, for all w ∈ I, disutility firms are indifferent between offering w orw (note that all payoff functions are continuous since the wage-offer distribution is continuous), and they do not hire B workers, so
But then the nondisutility firm offeringw can do strictly better by offering w ∈ I instead:
where the last equation uses ℓ B (w) = ℓ B (w) because only disutility firms (who reject B workers) offer wages in I and since the mass of nondisutility firms offeringw is zero.
Second, suppose the supports of F d and F n overlap on some open interval I. Then, the payoff function of a disutility firm, (p − w)ℓ A (w), and the one of a nondisutility firm, (p − w)ℓ(w) (with ℓ(w) = ℓ A (w) + ℓ B (w)) are both constant (and thus differentiable) at any w ∈ I, satisfying
which also implies that
Labor supply of A (B) workers to a firm offering w > p − d are
In the last equation, a B worker sends his second application to a disutility firm with probability λ. This firm either makes an offer at a wage below p − d, or rejects the worker. Thus none of these applications result in an offer which is preferred to w. Rewriting (9) and (10) yields
Subtracting (13) from (12) gives
which is a contraction since the left-hand side is strictly negative (because w is in the interior of I ⊂ supp F d ) and the right-hand side is non-negative.
Lastly, suppose the third possibility was true. Then, for all w ∈ I = (w d ,w), nondisutility firms are indifferent between offering w or w d ; hence (8) holds for all w ∈ I. Because labor supply of B workers to any w ∈ I is again (11), labor supply of A workers is
since no disutility firm offers a wage w ∈ I = (w d ,w). Thus, equation (8) can be expressed as
On the other hand, the slope of the payoff function of disutility firms at any w ∈ I is
where the third line uses (14). Now there are two possible cases. Either the last term is strictly positive which is a contradiction since then disutility firms could raise payoff by deviating from w d to w > w d . Or the last term is zero which implies F d (w d ) = 1. But then there must be a positive mass of disutility firms offering wages in another open intervalÎ ⊂ (p − d, w d ), so that one of the other two possibilities above (which also lead to contradictions) must apply.
This completes the proof of the Lemma. 2
Proof of Proposition 3:
It remains to prove the results on firm payoffs and profits. Suppose that d < d * (the other case is similar). Consider disutility firms first. Their payoff is
since the disutility firms offering w = 0 so it is greater than the zero payoff under laissez faire. Profits, however, differ among disutility firms: low-wage firms employ B workers so their profits are larger than profits of high-wage firms that do not employ B workers (so for them profit is the same as payoff). In fact, profit is lowest at π 
But this is clearly larger than payoff (=profit) under laissez faire, U n LF = 2σλd/N .2
Calculation of mean wages under laissez faire:
All A workers face a degenerate wage offer distribution that concentrates all mass at w A = p.
To calculate the mean wage of B workers, consider the situation that a B worker happens to send both of his applications to disutility firms. Then he gets both wage offers at w B = p − d. This case takes place with probability λ 2 . If a B worker sends one application to a disutility firm and the other to a nondisutility firm, he will always accept the offer from the nondisutility firm at a wage w B > p − d. This case takes place with probability 2λ(1 − λ). If a B worker happens to send both applications to nondisutility firms, he may get two different offers of which he accepts the larger one. This case occurs with probability (1 − λ) 2 . Consequently, the mean wage of B workers can be derived, which has the following expression. Calculation of mean wages under the equal-pay policy without affirmative action:
The mean wage of A workers is 
